approaches as narratives, their underlying assumptions and strategies and the meanings they correspondingly make can be examined.
11
Before examining resilience as a narrative, there are two other environmental narratives to examine: the narrative of tragedy and the narrative of sustainability. This Article argues that the tragedy and sustainability narratives are two stories about social-ecological relations that have characterized much of our thinking about environmental challenges since the early beginnings of the environmental movement in the United States. Each is reflected in our current laws and policies. While all three narratives-tragedy, sustainability and resilience-have substantial overlap
Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of
Law Reform, 44 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1209 (1991); My second reason for employing "narrative" as a way of approaching our current orientation to environmental challenges stems from my own background in mental health. In addition to a law degree, I have a graduate degree in community counseling, and I often view environmental problems through the lens of mental health strategies and techniques and then apply mental health approaches on a cultural scale. My one published example of this to date employs the concept of "addiction" and applies it to our collective relationship to oil. See Melinda Harm Benson, Are We Addicted to Oil? Lessons from Mental Health, 14 SOUTHWESTERN GEOGRAPHER 121 (2010). The theoretical orientation of narrative therapy takes the position that our stories matter-the meaning we assign events in our lives dictates in large part the tenor and quality of our experience. (2013) . Professor Burger uses Caroline Merchant's description of previous environmental narratives as including a "recovery narrative" (the biblical fall from grace and the quest to return to Eden) and "progressive narrative" (mainstream cultural perspectives and involves the search for a lost paradise through exploration, settlement, and the transformation of wilderness into a domesticated garden) and the related "declensionist narrative" (an environmentalist counternarrative attempts to either regain integrity of pristine nature through conservation/preservation). Id. at 910-11. in terms of their influence, this Article situates them historically, arguing that while each narrative is currently informing environmental discourse in various ways, the resilience narrative is gaining prominence.
After a brief description of the tragedy and sustainability narratives, this Article provides some basic background regarding resilience and then contrasts resilience thinking with our previous ways of conceptualizing environmental challenges. Of particular importance is that each of these narratives has a different relationship to knowledge generally and science specifically. While the concepts of resilience and sustainability are often used interchangeably, part of the argument made in this Article is that, while not inherently incompatible concepts, (1) resilience and sustainability are not the same and, (2) resilience may be a more productive and helpful way of framing "Environmental Law 4.0"-future governance orientations to the challenges we face. Before addressing sustainability and resilience, however, it is important to understand the first and arguably still most influential narrative in environmental law-the tragedy narrative. 12 
II. TRAGEDY NARRATIVE
The tragedy narrative began post World War II. The dramatic end of the war-with the use of nuclear weapons on the Japanese communities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki-was a turning event in human history for many reasons, among them a recognition of the capacity of humans to use weapons of mass destruction. 13 The end of the war gave rise to two intertwined aspects of this new reality. On the one hand, there was a sense of achievement: our new capacity to change our world was viewed with optimism and a sense of opportunity. 14 On the other hand, this new capacity filled us with fear. The invention of nuclear weapons brought with it an unprecedented ability to annihilate. World Wars I and II also developed something arguably more culturally influential than nuclear weapons-they brought us better living through chemistry. 15 The proliferation and use of chemical compounds that occurred both during and following these wars changed our world. While there are of course many post-WWII events worthy of discussion in terms of their influence, there are three events within this era that are often pointed to as being responsible for the birth of the American environmental movement.
The first is the proliferation of pesticides and herbicides in American agriculture and Rachel Carson's subsequent book Silent Spring.
16 Silent Spring is a beautifully written and scientifically based examination of the impact of pesticides, most notably DDT, on birds and other wildlife. Because of this publication, Rachel Carson is often referred to as the mother of the environmental movement.
17 She showed us the darker side of better living through chemistry and raised the alarm regarding the unintended consequences of pesticides.
The second event associated with this narrative is the worldwide distribution of the first view of the world itself-a photo called "Earthrise" taken by the Apollo 8 crew But it was the 1969 fire that brought forward environmental awareness. Which just goes to show: timing is everything when it comes to the meaning we place on individual events as narratives unfold. All these events-Carson's book, the Earthrise photo and the Cuyahoga River firecame at a time when Americans felt deeply vulnerable but also incredibly optimistic. 24 It was this combination of concern and idealism that gave birth to the environmental movement. While there was a growing fear of our newfound capacities to alter our world, there was also faith in the ability of science and technology to make the world a better place. 25 This narrative ushered in the "regulatory era" of the 1970s-a suite of environmental laws that took an ambitious and prescriptive approach to 19 Id. 20 the National Environmental Policy Act, 29 and the Clean Air Act 30 among others, share a number of characteristics. First they tend to take a "media" specific approach, meaning they focus on one kind of "problem"-air, water, waste, etc.-at a time. 31 Second, they are "command and control" in the sense that they rely on specific, enforceable regulatory requirements to meet their goals. 32 They are also jurisdictionally bound in the sense that they engage federal authority (often with state implementation) and reinforce traditional scales of governance. 33 Many of them rely on risk assessment and technology to identify and meet regulatory targets. 34 All are fear-based in the sense they are driven by health (as opposed to environmental) concerns and are framed around some perceived problem that needs to be solved. They each rely heavily on science to provide answers about the nature and extent of the risks involved and then on technology to provide workable solutions. 35 While most of these statutes have not reached their stated goals, it must be recognized that they have achieved significant successes, particularly with regard to pollution control, but also in terms of preventing species extinction and bringing increased environmental awareness with regard to federal agency actions. 36 This prescriptive command-and-control approach proved very effective addressing what might be considered the "low hanging fruit" or "end of pipe" environmental problems, i.e., those that can be addressed by identifying causes and then placing restrictions or processes on specific sources. 39 Unfortunately, however, this approach is ill-equipped to take on the next generation of environmental challenges. As already noted, these challenges include global climate change, biodiversity loss and increased rates of resource consumption-challenges with a different set of characteristics. 40 These characteristics include high degrees of complexity, associated radical uncertainties, and multi-scalar system dynamics. Gone are the days when a scientist like Rachel Carson could carefully review the literature on an environmental concern, isolate the cause, and raise the alarm in a way that results in meaningful change. 41 The global climate change reports from the United Nation's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change over the last two decades perhaps provide the most saddening example of this shift. 42 Despite a scientific consensus that anthropocentric causes are the critical driver of climate change, policy efforts have continued survey from 2000 reports that 28 percent of river miles, 23 percent of lake acreage and 15 percent of estuary miles failed to support swimming all or part of the time. There were similarly depressing numbers for the "fishable," goal with 34 percent of river miles 20 percent of lake acreage and fifty two percent of estuary miles not supporting aquatic life all or part of the time. to languish. 43 The tragedy, fear-based rhetoric regarding climate change has been ineffective.
Carson's formula of "science + fear = change"-a recipe that is still the main strategy embraced by the American environmental movement today-has realistically not worked for decades. 44 The reasons for this are many, but there are three worth highlighting. One is that Americans no longer have the sense of optimism and prosperity they did after WWII. 45 As a result, we are collectively less willing to take on environmental problems, fearing that doing so would harm economic growth. 46 Another reason is that we no longer have the same relationship with and trust in the federal government-which has been the primary source of the "change" aspect of Carson's formula. Increasingly, the federal government (and "government" in general) is viewed with skepticism. 47 Finally, this formula is no longer effective because a fear-based discourse tends to have a limited shelf life and a narrow window of opportunity. Issues like global biodiversity loss do not lend themselves to this type of rhetoric. Even climate change seems immune, in part because it is difficult to isolate any single weather or other environmental event and attribute it to climate change. Environmentalists pointed to events such as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy in hopes of turning the tide of U.S. climate policy, but that has not happened. 48 Our collective capacity to use a single or small set of individual events as a catalyst for policy change seems to be over. There is no "Love Canal" equivalent for climate change. 49 Part of this is perhaps due to our relationship to these types of events in the "information age," a context in which it is simultaneously more difficult to focus the culture's attention and more challenging to gain the confidence of the public that the information is reliable. 50 On a deeper level, the tragedy-based narrative is problematic because it reflects an underlying belief that humans are separate from nature-that we are an outside influence, messing things up. 51 This notion of separateness is a mistake in our perception of reality-an ontological misstep with serious consequences.
52 By placing ourselves outside of nature, we animate both the ideas that nature is "ours" to use (a progressive/manifest destiny narrative) 51 See Burger, supra note 11 (regarding separation narratives). 52 See NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 12, at 135 ("We are neither a cancer on, or stewards for, the planet. We are neither destined to go extinct nor to live in harmony. Rather, we are the first species to have any control whatsoever over how we evolve."). 53 Bill McKibben, perhaps one of the most influential environmentalists of our time, provides the quintessential example of this narrative in his book The End of Nature, in which the end of nature is human-influenced climate change and other human-based events that make the influence of human beings felt everywhere on the planet, i.e., when humans are everywhere, nature is nowhere. See generally BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (2006) . This narrative also has biblical roots with its story that humans have either "dominion over" or responsibility for "stewardship of" the earth, depending on the interpretation of the text. and what Professor Sarah Krakoff has described as a narrative based on the idea that we are "saving the environment from people and preserving pristine places from contamination. 54 This is pathologizing our current conditioncharacterizing humans as the main agent of disease/destruction. Little wonder then that young people are generally not attracted to the environmental movement. 55 The tragedy narrative-the casting of environmental challenges as scary events that must be immediately addressed by science and technology based regulation-has run its course. While there is no doubt that there have been tremendous gains with this strategy, the challenges of the Anthropocene require a new set of strategies and approaches.
III. SUSTAINABILITY NARRATIVE
The second narrative is the sustainability narrative. This environmental management story focuses less on problems and fears and more on finding a more balanced way to manage the impacts associated with resource consumption and other environmental woes. "Sustainability" in this case refers to the long-term ability to continue to engage in a particular activity, process, or use of natural resources. 56 To some extent, this narrative also gained initial influence in the 1970s when "multiple-use-sustained-yield" 61 We argue that there are underlying assumptions about sustainability that are important to reexamine, particularly in light of climate change. Specifically, the sustainability narrative tends to operate with the underlying assumptions where we: (a) know what can be sustained; and (b) have the capacity to hold onto some type of stationarity and/or equilibrium. 62 We argue that this narrative has also reached the end of its usefulness, as it has had little to no influence over the "wicked problems" described supra.
63
The pursuit of sustainable development goals has not resulted in effective mitigation of climate change; greenhouse gas emissions have continued to 57 Biodiversity loss is increasing at exponential rates.
65
In the summer of 2012, the UN held the "Rio + 20" conference, reflecting on the twenty years that passed since the Earth Summit. 66 In anticipation, the U.N. Environment Programme issued its Global Outlook report, which Executive Director Achim Steiner summarized by stating, "[I]f current patterns of production and consumption of natural resources prevail and cannot be reversed and 'decoupled,' then governments will preside over unprecedented levels of damage and degradation." 67 The report emphasized the increasingly likely possibility of large-scale irreversible change, concluding that as human pressures on the Earth system accelerate, critical thresholds at various scales are quickly being approached or, in some cases, have already been exceeded. 68 Particular emphasis was placed on non-linear change-impending social and ecological thresholds that, once crossed, would prove irreversible. 69 The report reflects a growing consensus that "stationarity" (the idea that natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of variability) is dead. 70 Yet any cursory review of environmental programs and associated academic literature reveals that, as a culture, we still embrace this narrative. 71 idea what we can sustain. 72 Our overarching thesis can be summarized with this three-pronged analysis: (1) sustainability goals for natural resources and the environment are based on assumptions of stationarity, (2) climate change and associated ecological dynamics are eliminating our ability to rely on stationarity, and therefore (3) we need a new paradigm for a world of continual change. 73 It's not that sustainability is not a laudable ideal; the issue is whether the sustainability narrative is still a helpful way of conceptualizing environmental governance goals. One particularly strong element of the sustainability story is that we cannot consider environmental, economic and social issues in isolation, and that inter and intra generational equity must be considered when crafting policy approaches. 74 However, rather than driving difficult conversations regarding the trade-offs required when examining the future costs of present actions, the sustainability narrative has devolved into a "have it all" discourse grounded in green consumerism. 75 By definition, sustainability assumes that there are desirable states of being for socialecological systems 76 that humans can maintain. This is a questionable assumption under the best of circumstances. In practice, sustainability-based goals proved difficult to achieve even before climate change and other related factors came on the scene.
77
While sustainability remains a vibrant narrative of much interest to many natural resource practitioners and legal scholars, efforts to "rethink" sustainability and its role in a climate-changed world are on the rise. In 2012, a group of law professors formed an Environmental Law Collaborative in an effort to take on this challenge. 78 Their initial efforts included an article in which the concept of sustainability is examined from various perspectives. 72 Michael Burger, for example, describes a "story of sustainability." 79 He notes that, while sustainability has been the most influential environmental idea of the last 30 years, its underlying story is a utopian one-one that is at best unrealistic and at worst deceptive: Sustainability has failed…to compel the radical transformational at the core of the countercultural social movement that invented modern environmental politics. Rather than inspire changes in the way we live necessary to actually redress the environmental crises, the sustainability story brackets big-ticket items like capitalism and consumerism, reifies existing actors and hierarchies, and affirms basic patterns of social organization, production and consumption. In short it is a deceptive story that perpetuates existing power dynamics that are in many respects the causes of global climate change. 80 While Professor Burger's argument regarding increasingly inappropriate tenor of the sustainability narrative was shared by many of his colleagues, the notion of jettisoning the concept of sustainability in favor of a new environmental goal was not the dominant view. 81 There remains a general reluctance to let go of this narrative. A key consideration is whether there is a new, perhaps more helpful and appropriate way to view social ecological relations. The question now considered is whether a narrative that invokes "resilience" is worthy of consideration.
IV. THE RESILIENCE NARRATIVE
In order to meaningfully engage the realities of social-ecological change in the Anthropocene, new policies and institutions must be developed that accommodate uncertainty and anticipate non-linear alterations of SES. The concept of "resilience" is increasingly invoked by natural resource 79 See Burger et al., supra note 54, at 10356-57. 80 See Burger et al., supra note 54, at 10356. 81 See generally Burger et al., supra note 54. managers and academic scholars. 82 The question presented here is two-fold. The first is whether there is embedded within this idea of resilience a new narrative. The second is whether the resilience narrative and its subsequent approaches to SES dynamics provide a sufficiently different and more productive orientation to challenges ahead.
In addressing the later question, it is important to examine whether sustainability and resilience are really different narratives. While not inherently incompatible concepts, resilience and sustainability are not the same. In fact, resilience scholars would be well advised to drop the sustainability narrative and its associated baggage. As explained supra, the pursuit of sustainability inherently assumes that we: (a) know what can be sustained; and (b) have the capacity to hold onto some type of stationarity and/or equilibrium. 83 These assumptions are no longer appropriate given the dynamics of SESs.
84
In contrast, resilience thinking is grounded in an acknowledgement of uncertainty and disequilibrium within SESs, with a ground-level acknowledgement that change is not only always possible but also to be expected. Resilience, as employed here, is defined as "the capacity of a system to absorb a spectrum disturbance and reorganize so as to retain essentially the same function, structure, and feedbacks-to have the same identity." 85 The focus is therefore on change as well as the system's capacity 82 See Benson & Garmestani, supra note 9, at 399. Scholarship in this area is too voluminous to summarize, but those interested in more information should check out the Resilience's Alliance's on-line journal Ecology and Society available at www.ecologyandsociety.org. 83 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 84 In fact, assumptions of stationary and equilibrium were probably never appropriate for ecological systems. See DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE 21
ST CENTURY (1992) (arguing ecological systems are constantly fluctuating, and our plans, policies, and laws governing the environment must change to reflect this new understanding). 85 to meaningfully respond to change. In contrast to the sustainability narrative, the emphasis in resilience thinking is on understanding the dynamics and complexities of the SESs, not on determining and then maintaining a fixed system state. The emphasis is building adaptive capacity rather than maintaining stationarity.
Resilience also acknowledges "surprise,"
86 the unpredictable qualities of SES, as well as novelty, creative and innovative elements within complex systems. 87 A related and critical component of a resilience orientation is the recognition that regime shifts can and will occur. As a result, a resilience narrative allows for a more realistic approach to management in the Anthropocene because it acknowledges nonlinear change and provides a way Novelty is generated as a result of the normal dynamics of complex systems. In terms of a panarchy with a discontinuous structure, novelty is generated at the edge of scale breaks (at the transitions between domains of scale) as a result of the highly variable distribution and occurrence of resources in space and time, which in turn is reflected in the high variability in biotic components of the system. This generation of novelty creates options for systems, is critical in maintaining adaptive capacity, and serves as a reservoir of potential functions that may be required following transformations or as normal system dynamics evolve. In the thermodynamics and gain literature, this has been termed internal complexification because it builds upon extant structures. Such novelty is at the heart of resilience. Id (citations omitted).
Allen and Holling describe three types of novelty: background, incremental and punctuated. Background novelty is generated as a result of the normal dynamics of complex systems. Incremental novelty describes, self-organizing and dynamic elements of a complex systems (such as an ecosystem, that adds complexity over time). Punctuated novelty is expressed by sudden, transformative shifts in system processes, which may occur at multiple scales.
of thinking about how to foster the SES components and dynamics we value and want to protect.
Where regime shifts occur, the emphasis is on transformation, defined as the system's capacity to reconceptualize and create a fundamentally new system with different characteristics."
88 Intentional transformation involves a conscious and deliberate negotiation from one system state to another. A system's transformative capacity is defined by the ability of the actors within the system to (1) be prepared to change (as opposed to being in a state of denial); (2) have the options for change (the identification of possible new "trajectories" for the system shift); and (3) have the capacity to change (the ability to make choices from among the possible new trajectories).
89
In this way, adaptive capacity within a SES can serve two purposes. Adaptive capacity is crucial, both when the management orientation is to maintain the current system state and when SES dynamics are such that transformation should or will occur. Transformative capacity highlights an important element of resilience theory that is often overlooked in policy discussions invoking the concept: a system state of "resilience" is not inherently "good" or "bad."
90 There are many examples of relatively stable and resilience SESs that are not desirable situations in which we want transformation to occur. An algae-ridden eutrophic lake is a stable ecological system but rarely a desirable system state. 91 Repressive dictatorships can also be remarkably resilient and decisively undesirable; the "Arab Spring" has been invoked as an example of regime change within a social system. 
questions-resilience of what and to what?
93 In other words, it is necessary to first identify overarching systems states (referred to as general resilience) and/or elements of the system we want to keep (specified resilience). Once the desired outcomes are recognized, an assessment of the perturbing factors and disturbances that must be considered when addressing potential or existing threats can take place.
94
If resilience theory only conceptualized processes for maintaining a system state, it would look more like (and be more compatible with) the sustainability narrative.
The emphasis on regime change and transformability, however, allows for a more realistic and productive orientation to many of the challenges we face, which are often characterized by factors outside of our control. well as late summer monsoonal rain patterns that historically distribute the majority of precipitation in the Middle Rio Grande Valley in July, August and September. 98 Estimates are that 93% of New Mexico's watersheds have become increasingly drier and that the timing of the runoff peak is an average of one week earlier than in the mid-20th century. The Rio Grande is no exception.
99 Temperature increases have already been observed in New Mexico and are predicted to continue. 100 Furthermore, milder winters and hotter summers are likely to result in increasing demand for water due to longer growing seasons and increased plant and human use. 101 At the same time, hotter and drier conditions will increase evaporative losses from reservoirs, stream flows and soils.
102 There will be consequences-both socially and ecologically-related to these shifting patterns, which can be summarized simply as "less water and more demand."
At the same time, drier and hotter conditions are causing large-scale wildfires and subsequent flooding events. 103 In 2011, the AlbuquerqueBernalillo Water Utility Authority had to shut down its drinking water supply plant, which takes water directly from the Rio Grande, for several months when ash from the Los Conchas fire in the upper watershed overwhelmed the 98 system's filtration capacity. 104 Projections are that larger fires will continue, and the forest die-off, resulting from a climate change-induced combination of less moisture, increased bark-beetle infestation, and high fuel loads resulting from decades of fire suppression, will provide an unprecedented stress on New Mexico forests-with corresponding impacts on water quality. 105 By using tools and approaches from each of the narratives discussed to examine the challenges in my home watershed, the benefits and limitations of each become visible. A tragedy narrative places great emphasis on isolating the problem and understanding the nature and extent of the risk. The extensive climate modeling taking place, including the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's West-Wide-Climate Risk Assessment, is reflective of this narrative. 106 This work is part of the agency's efforts under the Secure Water Act in 2009, which directs the agency to assess risks to the water resources of the American West, analyze the extent to which those risks will impact water deliveries, and develop strategies to mitigate those risks.
107
To date, however, those strategies do not include reexamining water allocation regimes in the West under the prior appropriation doctrine, a very (one might say pathologically) 108 resilient regulatory framework based on historical use basin under the Secure Water Act in 2009 invokes the concept of ecological resilience. 120 But without a more adaptive strategy for the social elements of the system, this work is unlikely to produce a meaningful and responsive approach to climate adaptation. 121 We are at a critical juncture with regards to integrating resiliencethinking into actual structures of governance. 122 We do have an opportunity to change our story, but in order to do so, we have to correspondingly let go of previous narratives. To date, there has been a reluctance to do so, especially to the extent to which resilience is perceived as a vehicle for normalizing existing relations, including historical inequities and environmental harms. 123 In other words, resilience is currently in danger of falling into the same traps Professor Burger described with regard to sustainability-a narrative that perpetuates existing power dynamics and historically inequitable allocation regimes. While much of the resilience-oriented work to date has ignored the problematic nature of existing power relations and historically inequities, this is arguably a problem with various applications of the resilience concept rather than the theory itself. We bring our (often unquestioned) perceptions of SES and the values that inform those perceptions to any application of resilience thinking. Still, the ability of resilience thinkers to be more critical in this regard will play a large role in determining the extent to which resilience actually becomes a sufficiently different and more productive orientation.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article examines three different narratives that operationalize different types of beliefs about social-ecological relations. Presented in roughly chronological order in terms of their relative influence on environmental law and policy, first came the tragedy narrative. A tragedyoriented story sees people as creators of problems that need to be solved and focuses on using the tools of modernity, including the scientific method and tools from economics such as risk assessment, to understand those problems. It then crafts mechanisms to control and manage that risk. While many of the significant environmental successes of the past several decades are attributable to this approach, this storyline has several limitations. The wicked problems of the Anthropocene do not lend themselves to traditional "command and control" solutions because their extreme complexity and associated radical uncertainties make risk assessment and control limited at best. Perhaps even more importantly, humans are cast as the source of environmental problems by being outside forces that are messing up nature and ruining the planet. This reflects the social construction of an ontology in which humans are separate from nature. It is a shame and fear-based approach that has proven unsuccessful in motivating humans to take on environmental challenges during the last several decades. The tragedy narrative has taken us as far as it can.
The sustainability narrative is no longer an appropriate way to conceptualize environmental goals. Given the end of stationarity and the inherent disequilibrium of dynamic systems, it probably never was. The sustainability narrative takes a more optimistic, but inevitably naïve, view of social-ecological relations. Based on the idea that we can somehow determine the appropriate pace and scale of resource extraction and use, sustainability makes inaccurate assumptions about our capacity to maintain a state of ecological equilibrium. Sustainability's "have it all discourse" serves the interests of the status quo existing power allocations that profit enormously from assumptions that green consumerism and further development can address the wicked problems we face. The concept of stationarity was effectively destabilized in the natural sciences long ago, but the storyline continues in our laws and policies through the narrative of sustainability.
Resilience is a new, emerging narrative-one that provides a more helpful orientation toward management in the Anthropocene. It places emphasis on research and policy efforts that help us to understand and cope with change. Shifting the governance focus from sustainability to resilience is not admitting defeat, nor is it abandoning the goals of intra-and intergenerational equity. This is an important contribution of the sustainability narrative we should keep. In fact, the resilience narrative arguably has the potential to do a better job of taking on current power relations and historical inequities, but it requires transparent discussions about what we value in our SES and the trade-offs we face.
Regardless of any particular narrative or way of conceptualizing social-ecological relations, the way in which we perceive and therefore orient ourselves towards environmental challenges matters. The stories we tell about our situation not only assign meaning to past and current events, but also determine the options available to us. A resilience narrative has the potential to foster and develop the strategies that are necessary to anticipate and negotiate our complex and rapidly changing world. These strategies will necessarily include a number of elements. One is a healthier relationship to science and other forms of knowledge production in the Anthropocene. When we examine the narratives currently animating most environmental governance regimes, we notice assumptions about the role of science and its ability to provide definitive answers. But the scientific method has never been good at-or built for-providing such answers. Past narratives reflect a RECONCEPTUALIZING ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES-IS RESILIENCE THE NEW NARRATIVE?
126 faith in science and technology often based on hubris-the future will require humility.
An additional related assumption underlying past narratives involves our ability to take action and control situations that are identified as environmental challenges. Unfortunately, the nature and complexity of climate change and other wicked problems do not lend themselves to resolution or control. That is not to say that action is not critical. Rather, future strategies cannot realistically be expected to "solve" these problems. Instead, we will be responding to them as meaningfully and effectively as we can. Another assumption held by past narratives relates to how meaningful responses will take place. The UN's incapacity to rally the international community to take on enforceable commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is perhaps the most significant and tragic example of the failure of formal, historically based institutions moving forward. Future strategies will embrace both formal and informal institutional methods at a variety of temporal and spatial scales.
A narrative of resilience has the ability to embrace these strategies. Rather than relying on science to provide timely answers, resilience thinking focuses on asking interesting questions that allow for refinement of continually emerging understandings of SESs. Rather than identifying an institutional "fix," resilience focuses on building adaptive capacity-a vitally important characteristic whether the goal is to maintain a certain SES state or gracefully transform to a new one. It is a narrative grounded in understanding and responding to change. As such, it provides a new way of thinking about our relationship to the environmental and natural resource challenges of the Anthropocene. As a way to reconceptualize socialecological relations resilience has the potential to shift the environmental governance paradigm in new and interesting ways.
